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RECENT CASES.
CARRIERs-Dt'TY TO CALL OUT STATIONS-A railroad porter induced a
passenger to alight at the -wrong station, telling her it was her destination.
The name of the station had not been called out; it was dark at the time,
and she did not discover the mistake until the train had left. Held: She
could recover against the railroad. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Myers, 70
So. ,86 (Ala. zqx5).
It is generally held to be the duty of a carrier to, notify its passengers
or to have its stations announced as the trains approach. Southern Railroad
v. Ilobbs, 18. Ga. 227 (9o3)); Railroad v. Kendrick, 40 Miss. 374. (x866).
A failure to notify the passengers or to announce a station is not negligence
per se, and a failure to comply with this duty will not give rise to a cause
of action in favor of a passenger who is in no way misled thereby. Rail-
road v. Goodyear, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 206 (19o2) ; Railroad v. Hobbs, supra.
But if a carrier negligently announces as the station to which a passenger is
destined, a different station, and the passenger is thereby misled and induced
to alight, he may recover damages for such injuries as are the natural con-
sequences of the wrong committed. Railroad v. Hardie, 1o Miss. 132
(1912) ; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. r47 (1854). It seems that all
that is necessary on the carrier's part is to give a reasonable warning or
notice which may be presumed to be sufficient to give notice to passengers
in the exercise of reasonable care and vigilance on their travels. Mearns v.
Railroad, 163 N. Y. io8 (goo).
See also Hooker v. Blair, 155 N. IV. 364 (Mich. z915), annotated in this
issue on page 516.
CARRIERS-INJURY TO PASSENGER LEAviNG TRAIN BEFORE REACHING
STATION BUT AFTER hT HAS BEEN "CALLED"-A brakeman called out the name
of the station a train was approaching and then opened the vestibule door.
A passenger who thought the train had stopped stepped off and was injured.
l d: The railroad was not liable. Hooker v. Blair, 155 N. W. 364 (Mich.
1915).
Generally, the announcement of the name of a station is intended to
inform the passengers that the train is approaching their destination and
is not of itself an invitation to alight, but rather a notice to passengers
bound for that station to alight when the train stops. England v. Railroad,
153 Mass. 490 (891) ; Payne v. Railroad, io6 Tenn. 167 (90oo). The carrier
usually is not bound to be on the lookout to prevent passengers jumping
off moving trains, when there is no notice, express or implied, of their
intention to do so. Morris v. Railroad, 127 La. 445 (igio); Railroad v.
Massey, 97 Miss. 794 (191o). The passenger must exercise reasonable care
and vigilance in traveling, and it is to be expected that he will be as sensi-
tive as a railroad employee to the fact that a train is in motion or at rest.
Mearns v. Railroad, 163 X. '. io8 (19oo). The carrier, however, must be
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careful not to invite the passenger to alight in a dangerous or improper place,
while the train is in motion, etc. The railroad is liable if the passenger, in the
exercise of due care and discretion, is mislcd by the words or conduct of the
carrier's servants and is injured thereby. Railroad v. Mullen, 217 IlL 203
( io.;) : Railway v. Lucas, r19 Ind. ;83 (Mg) ; Ilartzig Y. Railway, i Pa.
364 (893). The question of the negligence of the carrier and the contributory
negligence of the injured is for the jury on all the circumstances of the
case. Barry v. Railroad, 172 Mass. iog (1898) ; Railroad v. Garcia, 62 Tex.
285 (1884). As to duty to call out stations, see Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
Myers, 7o So. 186 (Ala. 79iS), annotated in this i~sue on page 516.
COxNSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER-PURX FOOD AcT-A dealer in
meats was convicted under a statute which made it unlawful for any
person to sell sausage which contained cereal in excess of two per cent. Held:
The restriction was a valid exercise of the police power. People v. Dehn.
115 N. NV. 744 (Mich. ixg6).
The police power of a state is not limited to regulations for the preser-
vation of good order, or the public health and safety, but may extend to the
prevention of fraud and deceit in the sale of articles of food. Armour Pack-
ing Co. v. Snyder, 84 Fed. 136 (1897) ; Plumley v. Massachusetts, x55 U. S.
461 (1894). The word "sausage" is defined by all lexicographers as an
article of food composed of meat, .salt and spices; and cereals are not
recognized generally as an ingredient of pure sausage. St. Louis Packing
Co. v. Houston, 215 Fed. 556 (i9xo); Armour v. Food Commissioner, 159
Mich. To (Igo). The prohibition of the coloring of oleomargarine has"
been held to be a valid exercise of the police power, in preventing the
deception of the publit, rather than for the protection of health. People v.-
Rotter. 131 Mich. 250 (i9o) ; State v. Packing Co., 124 -Iowa 323. (04).
For the same reason it has been held to be a valid exercise of the police
power to prohibit the sale of milk, cream and ice cream which contains
less than a certain percentage of fat and solids, although the product may
be wholesome and sold in its natural state without adulteration. State v.
Ice Cream Co., T47 N. W. 2o (Iowa 1914); State v. Campbell, 64 N. H.
402. (IM6) ; State v. Creamery Co., 83 Minn. 284 (igoi). The legislature
is the sole judge of the necessity and propriety of preventing deception in
the sale of the article by appropriate legislation. Powell v. Pennsylvania,
127 U. S. 678 (1887). If the standard prescribed is unreasonable the legis-
lature must correct it, not the courts. People v. Worden, 118 Mich. 604
(898) ; People v. Girard, T45 N. Y. io (895).
CONSTITUTIONAL L w-POHIDInITivE TAx ON TRADING STAMPS-A statute
of Oregon imposed an excise tax of five per cent. on the gross receipts of any
person using or furnishing to others trading stamps. Held: This tax being
obviously intended to inhibit the use of such stamps, the statute was void
as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cottrell v. Sperry & Hutch-
inson Co., 227 Fed. 256 (z915).
The legality of the trading stamp business has been very generally
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affirmed by the courts. State v. Shugart, 138 Ala. 86 ('igo); State v.'Ram-
seycr. 73 N. H. 31 (19o4) ; State v. Dodge, 76 Vt. 197 (i9o4). Therefore it
is held almost unanimously that statutes forbidding the use of trading stamps
are unconstitutional, as an unwarrantable invasion of the liberty of the
citizen and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States and similar personal rights clauses in the state constitu-
tions. State v. Caspare, 115 Md. 7 (19i); Es Porte Drexel, 74" Cal. 763
(jo5). Nor can the legislature do indirectly what it cannot do directly, by
imposing on the business of selling or giving stamps a tax so oppressive as to
be prohibitive. Little v. Tanner, 208 Fed. 6o5 (1913); Sperry & H. Co. v.
Owensboro, 151 Ky. 389 (1012). In a small minority of cases, however, the
right of the state to regulate or prohibit the trading stamp enterprise is
upheld. D. C. v. Kraft. 35 App. D. C. 253 (I910).
CONSTITUTIONAi LAw-TAxATIoX-Er.CATIO,AL I.NSTITUTioS-The net
income from an office building owned by the board of education of a church
conference was employed in the partial support of a non-sectarian college
maintained by the conference in another city. A constitutional provision
exempted from taxation institutions of education not used for gain, and the
income of which is devoted solely to education. Held: The property was
exempt. Commonwealth v. Board of Education of M. F. Church, 179 S. W.
596 (Ky. 19T5).
Where the rent from property owned by an educational institution is
applied to the support of the institution, under some provisions such property
is exempt from laxation. Northampton County v. Lafayette College, 128
Pa. 132 (1889); Scott v. St. Johnsburg Academy, 84 Atl. 567 (Vt. 1912),
while under others the property to be exempt must be used and appropriated
for the distinctive educational purposes. Monticello Seminary v. Board. etc.,
of Madison County. 249 Ill. 481 (i911) ; Stahl v. Kansas Educational Assn.
etc., _ Kan. 542 (895): Burr v. City of Boston, 209 Mass. 18 (igii). Prop-
erty of a fraternity, although built on a college campus, has been held not
exempt. Phi Beta Epsilon Corp. v. Boston. 182 Mass. 457 (1903); In-
habitants of Orono v. Kappa Sigma Society, 8o Atl. 831 (Me. 19n), but it
has been held otherwise where the building is used as a literary hall and
dormitory. Kappa Kappa Gamma House Ass'n v. Pearcy, 92 Kan. 1ozo, 52
L. R. A. (N. S.) 995 (1914).
Insiances of property within the exemption are the following: Dormi-
torics and dining halls of the institution. Yale Univ. v. New Haven. 71 Conn.
316 (1899): the residence of a professor owned by a college and occupied
free of rent. Harvard College v. Assessors. 175 Mass. 145 (I9oo): a college
building in a room of which a store is conducted for the benefit of the athletic
association. Mercersburg College v. Mercersburg Borough. 53 Pa. Super. Ct.
38 (1013'): a laundry. waterworks system, and hotel used as adjuncts to a
college. Com. v. Berca College. 14c) Ky. o5 (1)12); a clubhouse used by
students and alhmuui for recreation and social purposes. Chicago v. Univ. of
Chicago; 228 Ill. 6o3, 1o Am. Cas. 669 (i9o7).
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Examples of property held subject to taxation are the following: A
dwling-house on college land rented to one not an employee of the college,
Amherst College v. Assessors, 193 Mass. 168 (19o6) ; a house on land of the
institution, occupied by a professor as a dwelling and not for "literary
purposes." Kendrick v. Farquhar, 8 Ohio 189 (1837); lands used for agri-
cultural purposes, and a water-pumping station for revenue, Kenyon College
v. Schnebly. 3i Ohio Cir. Ct. i.o (i9o)) ; buildings of schools for teaching
dancing, riding. etc.. People v. Deutsche. etc., Gemeinde, 249 IIL. 132 (1911);
a garden, the produce of which was used by the students, St. Bridget Con-
vent Corporation v. Town of Milford, 87 Conn. 474 (1913).
CONTRAC-TS-CF.RTAIXTv--SPECFIC Pgr'ORMAIcr..ln contracting for the
sale of motion picture rights the negotiations, which consisted of an exchange
of telegrams, showed that no mention had been made of matters vital to
both parties. Held: Specific performance cannot be granted. Davis v. Epoch
Producing Corp.. 155 X. Y. S. 597 (i9iS).
It is well settled that specific performance of a contract will not be
decreed unless the contract contains all material terms. Huff v. Shepherd,
58 Mo. 242 (1874) ;'Mayer v. McCreery, 119 N. Y. 434 (i8go). Moreover,
it is essential that such material terms of the contract be certain, exact, and
unequivocal. Walcott v. Watson, 53 .Fed. 429 (1892) ; Ham v. Johnson, 55
Minn. 115 (1Q93) ; Brown v. Brown, 33 N. J. Eq. 650 (i88i). It is also
necessary that the parties be positively designated by the contract. Los
Angeles Land Assn. Y. Phillips, 56 Cal. 539 (i88o); Stanton v. Miller, 58
N. Y. 192 (1874). If the price is not fixed by the agreement or the means
provided for ascertaining the price with certainty, the contract would be
plainly incomplete and could not be enforced. Blogden v. Bradbear, 12 Ves.
466 (Eng. i8o6); Williams v. Morris. 95 U. S. 444 (1877); Trustees v.-
Bigelow, 16 Wend. 28 (N. Y. 1836). While it is the settled rule that equity
will not grant specific performance where the price is to be determined by
arbitrators and where the award has not been made, Milnes v. Gery, 14 Ves.
400 (Eng. 187) ; Noyes v. Marsh, 123 Mass. 286 (1877) ; still if such award
is not one of the essential terms, but relates only to minor details that might
arise, the decree will be granted. Union Pacific Ry. v. Chicago, etc., Rwy. 51
Fed. 3o9 (1&9): Coles v. Peck. 96 Iad. 333 (i8t4). The doctrine that per-
formance will not be decreed unless the contract is complete and certain is
applied more strictly against the representatives and assignees of the original
contracting parties than against the parties themselves. "i How. 499 (Miss.
1837) ; Odell v. Morin. 5 Ore. 96 (1873). If a written contract contains all
the material terms, it may be specifically enforced though indefinite on its
face, provided the court can supply the necessary exactness by reference
made therein to other documents or by admissible parol evidenc. Fowler v.
Fowler, 204 I1. 82 (19o3) ; Pratter v. Miller, id N. C. 628 (1825); Peay v.
Seigler, 48 S. C. 496 0896).
As is pointed out in the principal case, a decree will not be granted where
specific performance is impossible or where it would subserve no useful
purpose. Kennedy v. Ilazleton, 1,8 V. S. 667 (1888); AVerden v. Graham,
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128 U. S. 667 (iM18); Rommel v. Summit Coal Co., 78 Super. Ct. 482 (Pa.
igoi). However , where the contract is divisible, specific performance may
be granted for part and ,ompensation awarded for the breach of the other
part. United States v. Alexandria. 19 Fed. 6o9 (1882) ; Adams v. Messinger,
147 'Mass. z85 (x&8M). It is pointed out in the principal case that it is not a
ground for refusing specific performance that a formal contract was not
executed. Such a view logically follows from the rule prevailing in a
majority of states that if a complete contract has been entered into, it is none
the less binding because it was understood between the parties that the agree-
ment should later be formally reduced to writing and executed. Sanders v.
Pottlitzer Fruit Co., T44 N. Y. 209,(1894): Blaney v. Hoke, T4 Ohio St. 292
(1863); Cohn v. Plumer, 88 Wis. 622 (1894).
Co.m . CTs-Covr.NA.Ts 7x RESTRAINT OF TRADE-A corporation, the
trade of which had extended into a large number of states and into Canada,
upon selling one branch of its business with the machinery and good will,
covenanted not again to go into the manufacture of the articles embraced
in that branch of its business. Held: The covenant was valid. Hall Mfg.
Co. v. Western Steel & Iron Works. 227 Fed. 588 (igi5).
Whether a covenant in restraint of trade be general or particular, its
validity, under the modern doctrine, is tested by determining whether, on
the facts of the particular case. it is reasonable. Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nor-
denfelt Gun Co. (1894), App. Cas. 535 (Eng.): Standard Oil Co. v. United
States. 22 U. S. I (79To) : and is supported by a valid consideration. Hub-
bard v. Miller, 27 Mich. 15 (i873) ; Cleaver v. Lenhart, 182 Pa. 285 (1897).
Tested by the rule of reason, a restrictive covenant is not necessarily valid
because it is limited in time and place. Consumers' Oil Co. v. Nunneaker,
142 Ind. s6o (z80" ; Lufkin Rule Co. v. Fringeli. 57 Ohio St. 596 (1898). If
injury to the public outweighs the public policies of honesty and freedom
of alienation, the restrictive covenant will not be enforced. Stewart v.
Stearns. etc., Lumber Co., 56 Fla. 57o. 649 (T9o8); Nester v. Continental
Blrewing Co.. 16i Pa. 473 (1894). By the same rule of reason a restrictive
covenant is not necessarily invalid because it is unlimited in time, Foss v.
Roby. 15 Mass. 202 (1007) : Southworth v. Davidson, 1o6 Minn. Ir9 (19o) ;
in place, Electric Co. v. Hawkes. 171 Mass. ToT (z898); or, in both time
and place. Prame v. Ferrell, T66 Fed. 7n2 (i9O9); United Shoe Machinery
Co. v. Kimball, t93 .Mass. 351 (0oo7). As a general rule, however; contracts
in restraint of trade unlimited as to both time and place, are held void as
against public policy. Ryan v. Hlamilton, 2.5 II. i91 (0o3); Tecktonius v.
Scott. 110 Wis. 441 (T9o1). In determining the validity of the restraint the
nature of the business is' of importance. Garst v. Harris. 177 Mass. 72
(igoo) ; Tode %. Gross. 127 N. Y. 480 (18m). The restrictive covenant must
be incidental or ancillary to the main purpose of securing to the covenantee
the protection needed by him. Harris v. Thues. 149 Ala. T33, 204 (1907);
Ilarbinson-Walker Co. v. Stanton. 227 Pa. 55 (1910).
CORPORAT1OrXs-DiVmrvxI s-R1r71T OF STOCKHOLDER TO COMPEL DismwIu-
TON-A corporation had not declared a dividend though it had received net
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proceeds to a large amount and despite the stipulation in its certificates that
preferred stockholders should receive an annual cumulative dividend. A
preferred stockholder brought a bill in equity to compel distribution. Held:
An order should be entered compelling the corporation to declare a dividend.
Lee v. Fisk, 109 N. E. 8,33 (Mass. 1915).
The fact that the dividends of a preferred stockholder are in terms
guaranteed does not make them payable at all events, as it is well settled that
such stockholders are entitled to payment only when there are surplus profits
out of which dividends may be lawfully declared. Warren v. King, io8 U. S.
389 (8,82) : Miller v. Ratterman. 4 "Ohio 141 (z89o) ; Taft v. Hartford R. R.
Co., 8 R. 1. 310 (1866). However, if the preferred stockholders are guar-
anteed a certain annual dividend, such dividends are cumulative, and if not
paid at the end of any one year. they must be paid in subsequent years,
before any dividends can be paid on common stock. Lockhart v. Van Alstyne,
31 Mich. 76 (1875); Boardman v. Lake Shore Railway Co., 84 N. Y. 157
(iS8I). Until a dividend has been actually declared by the directors, the
stockholders have no legal right or title to any of the assets, although there
is a fund out of which payments might lawfully be made. Phelps v. Farmers
Bank. 26 Conn. 269 (1857) American Nail Co. v. Gedge, 96 Ky. 513 (1895).
While it is primarily a question for the directors to determine whether the
condition of the corporation is such as to warrant the declaration of a divi-
dend, still if they arbitrarily or fraudulently abuse this discretion, a court of
equity will compel them to act at the suit of a stockholder. Storrow v.
Manufacturing Assn.. 87 Fed. 612 (1898): Laurel Land Co. v. Fougeray, 50
-N. J. Eq. 756 (1893.)
All of the authorities agree with the principal case on the point that if
the directors or other officers of the corporation fraudulently appropriate
its property to their own use or otherwise dispose of it, they will be pet-*
sonally liable. Briggs v. Spaulding. 141 U. S. 132 (i89g): Commercial Bank
v. Chatfield. 12T Mich. 641 (i,899g ; Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. ix (1872). In
the absence of statute, however, the general rule is that a suit
to recover damages for the wrongful act of the director must
be brought by the corporation. Hodgson Y. Duluth Railway, 46 Minn. 454
(189) ; Southwest Gas Co. Y. Fayette Company, r45 Pa. 13 (1891). If the
corporation refuses to act. the shareholders may do so in their own names, in
equity. Slatterty Y. St. Louis Co., 91 Mo. 217 (1886); but before they can
maintain such bill, they must show. in addition to grievances calling for
equitable relief, that an earnest effort was made to have the managing body
act. Hawes v. Oakland. 104 U. S. 450 (80x). However, a shareholder may
bring a bill in equity, without a previous request to the corporation to do so,
if it appears that such request would have been useless or would have been
refused. Knoop Y. Bohmrick. 49 N. J. Eq. 83 (891) ; Dowd v. Wisconsin
Railway Co., 65 Wis. o8 (1886).
Co0RPR.Tzo's-PLrix,. oF SncK-Divatvl txns-Stock was transferred to
the plaintiff to hold as collateral security and later the dividends on these
shares were paid to the real owner of the stock. Held: The plaintiff was
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entitled to recover these dividends from the owner of the stock. National
Bank of Commerce v. Equitable Trust Co., 227 Fed. 526 (i9iS).
One who accepts stock as collateral security and causes the same to be
transferred to his own name on the corporation books, incurs immediate lia-
bility as a stockholder as to creditors. National Bank v. Case, g9 U. S. 628
t1878) ; Converse v. Paret. 228 Pa. 157 (igio). But where the record shows
that the shares were taken as collateral security, the pledgee assumes no
liability for debts of the corporation. Beale v. Essex Savings Bank, 67 Fed.
S16 (895); Fields & Co. v. Evans Co.. To6 Minn. 85 (igo8). With regard
to dividends, the general rule undoubtedly is that the pledgee is entitled to
receive all dividends during the continuance of the pledge. Brady v. Irby,
142 S. W. 1i24 (Ark. i912) ; Skinner v. Taft, 140 Mich. 282 (o5) ; although
the parties may agree otherwise by express contract. Guarantee Co. v.
Town Co.. 96 Ga. 511 (1&)5). But where the pledgee's interest doesn't appear
on the corporation records, the company is justified in paying dividends to
the real owner of the stock. Gemmel v. Davis & Co., 75 Md. 546; Brisbane
v. D. L & W. R. R. CO., 25 Hun. 438 (N. Y. 1881). In such a case, however,
the pledgor holds the amount of the dividends in trust for the pledgee. Sav-
ings Bank v. Marshall, 68 N. H. 417 (1895); Hlermann v. Maxwell, 47 Super.
Ct. 347 (N. Y. 1880.
If the transfer has been recorded or if the corporation has actual knowl-
edge of the pledge, payment of dividends must be made to the pledgee.
Timberlake v. Compress Co., 72 Miss. 323 (1894); Boyd v. Conshohocken
Mills. 149 Pa. 363 (18w2). And this is true even though the by-laws of the
corporation require all transfers to be recorded. National Bank v. Wilder,
32 Neb. 454 (18o). The corporation must pay to the pledgee, although there
was no knowledge of a transfer until after a dividend had been declared and
passed to the credit of the pledgor. Steel v. Island Milling Co., 47 Ore. 293.
(19o6). It has been held that it is not wrongful for the pledgee to accept a
stock dividend in lieu of a cash dividend. Whitney v. Whitney. 14o N. W.
3; (Wis. 1913'). Where large profits have been earned and no dividends
declared and where the pledgor is refused permission to examine the books,
he may. despite the fact that his stock has been pledged, bring a bill com-
lelling a dividend to be declared. Anderson v. Dyer, 94 Minn. 30 (1904);
Booth v. Consolidated Jar Co.. 62 Misc. 252 (N. Y. 1g9)0). It is important
to note. however, that all dividends received by the pledgee are for the benefit
of the pledgor and must be accounted for by the pledgee. Smith v. Quartz
Mining CO.. 14 Cal. 24.! (1859); Reid v. Caldwell, t-zo Ga. .718 (19o4);
Bryson v. Rayner. 25 Md. 424 (i866).
CRIMINAL LAw-Fo.N1I v JF.to.tRtY-A prisoner was indicted on a charge
of murder, and pleaded not guilty. Before a jury could be impaneled. a
ilk prose'qui was entered. and the prisoner was discharged without bail.
In a suhseiuent trial for the same offense, the defendant pleaded former
jeopardy. ild: The defendant was never in jeopardy. State v. Smith, 87
S. EtF. 98 (N. C. 1915').
It is a universally accepted principle of the common law that no person
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shall be placed in jeopardy more than once for the same offense. 4 BL
Comm. 330; Williams v. Com.. 78 Ky. 93 (1879). The doctrine has been
embodied in the federal and state constitutions. But it is not to be invoked
by one who by his own conduct has made it impossible for a valid verdict
or judgment to be rendered against him. People v. Higgins, 59 CoL 357
(88). So also where the defendant consents to the discharge of the jury
after a void or defective verdict, he cannot plead former jeopardy. People -
v. Kern, 8 Utah 268 (892).
The great weight of authority is that jeopardy does not arise until after
the jury is duly impaneled and sworn. i Wharton Crim. Law (tith Ed.) 517;
Alexander v. Com.. io5 Pa. 1 (1884). Nor does nolle prosequi amount to an
acquittal, except where it is entered after the prisoner's jeopardy has begun.
U. S. v. Farring. 4 Cranch C. C. 465 (1832). In every case the action must
be taken by one having proper authority. A discharge by an examining.
magistrate, police magistrate, or any court without jurisdiction is no bar to
a subsequent trial by a court having jurisdiction. Com. v. Goddard, 13 -Mas&
455 (816).
EQUITY JI'R1SDICTION-CACELAT1ON OF IXsLMENrTs-Laches-After
making a conveyance of land to the grantee upon the latter's promise to
support her, the grantor lived with the grantee for sixteen years, at the end
of which period she removed from the grantee's household and then brought
an action to obtain the cancellation of the deed. Held: The grantor's right
of action was barred because of laches. Saper v. Cisco, 95 At oi6 (N. J.
1915).
Proceedings for the cancellation of an instrument must be begun promptly
as an unwarranted delay will bar all rights of the complainant. Goree v.
Clements, 94 Ala. 337 (1891); Appeal of Hewitt, 55 Md. 5og (i88s).- In such
cases equity is not bound by the Statute of Limitations, but decides upon the
facts of each case whether there has been due diligence in seeking relief.
Mattlock v. Todd. 25 Ind. 128 (865) ; Pussey v. Gardner, 2t \V. Va. 469
( 13): although equity frequently adopts a period similar to that set forth
in the statute of limitations. Askhew v. Hooper, 28 Ala. 634 (1856); McCann
v. Welch. o6 Wis. T42 (tgoo). However, mere delay, especially if there is
no change in the situation of the parties, will not deprive the defrauded
party of his remedy so long as he remains ignorant of the fraud. Bishop v.
Thompson. 196 II. 2o6 (19o2); Manning v. Mulrey, 192 Mass. 547 (igo6).
But if the fraud could have been discovered by reasonable diligence, the
party is bound as though he had knowledge. -Davis v. Harper, 23 Ind. 567
(1864) : Wood v. Jones. 87 Ky. 511 (888 ). The rule in New York. however,
is that the defrauded party owes no duty of active vigilance in discovering
the fraud. Baker v. Lever. 67 X. Y. 3o4 (186).
The heirs or devisees of a testator from whom third persons fraudulently
have obtained a deed are nt chargeable with Iaches until the land has
actually descended to them. Ring v. Lawless. ioo 11. 5-o (i9oT); Hemphill
v. I lalford. &S Mich. -93 ( &v)1). A person will not be barred by laches in a
suit to obtain cancellation where such suit is begun immediately after the
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termination of an unsuccessful suit for reformation of the instrument.
Russel v. Russel, I-2 Fed. 4.34 (i904). The fact that the grantor takes no
steps for several years does not estop him from maintaining an action on the
ground that there was no valid delivery. O'Conner Y. O'Conner, ioo Iowa
476 (ti96). Laches will not bar an action where after the deed was frauadu-
lently obtained the grantor remained in possession and when at all times the
grantee recognized the grantor as having a valid title to the property. Tread-
well v. Torbet, 122 Ala. 297 (1898) ; Case v. Case, 2-6 Mich. 484 (1873).
Equity is reluctant to excuse delay in those cases where as a result of
the delay the party sought to be charged with fraud-has had hit means of
defense impaired by the death, insanity, or loss of memory of disinterested
witnesses. Mann v. Laufer, 4 Ky. Law Rep. 348 (1882) ; Lutzen v. Lutzen,
64 N. J. Eq. 773 (9o2) ; McCann v. Welch, io6 Wis. 142 (1900).
EQUITY JURISPICTIoN-SPEcIFIC PERFORMAE-ACR61EVT, To GivE Ix-
NI vNITY Bon-D--k bill was filed to enforce an agreement to give a bond with
surety for the faithful performance of a contract. Held: The contract should
be specifically performed. Bosch Magneto Co. v. Rushmore, 95 At. 614
(N. J. 1915).
Equity will enforce an agreement to give indemnity on the ground of
the inadequacy of a remedy at law. Chamberlain v. Blue, 6 Blackf. 491 (Ind.
183); Wilson v. Davidson County, 3 Tenn. Ch. 536 (1877); Hicks v. Turck,
72 Mich. 3I1 (:888). The general rule is that the agreemeht will be en-
forced where the specified thing or act contracted for. and not mere pecuniary
compensation, is the redress practically required. Irvine -'. Armstrong, 31
Minn. 216 0183) : Rothholz v. Schwartz, 46 N. J. Eq. 477 (89). So equity
compels the giving of a realty mortgage as security. Lowe v. Walker, 77
Ark. 1o3 (igo_;) ; Speer v. Allen, 135 S. W. 231 (Tex. i91); also chattel
mortgages. Williamson Y. New Jersey S. R. Co.. 26 N. J. Eq. 3o8 (i875);
Ryan v. Donley. 6) Neb. 623 (1903). Specific performance will also be
decreed in contracts for the assignment of accounts as collateral security.
Preston Bank v. Purifier Co.. 84 Mich. 364 (x89o) ; Central Trust Co. v.
Louisville Trust Co., 87 Fed. 23 (io8). A contract to pledge real and per-
sonal property has likewise been upheld. forris v. McCutcheon, 213 Pa. 349
('9o6).
EvIDENCE-A M sSntlI.ITY iF SKIA:RAPIts-i an action for personal in-
juries. skiagraphs showing the injuries to plaintiff's leg. which are identified as
having been taken by surgeons by means of X-ray apparatus, may be received
in evidence. Ingebretsen v. Minn.. etc.. R. Co., 155 N. XV. 327 (Iowa 1915).
Photographs are admitted in evidence when the proper preliminary proof
as to their exactness and accuracy is offered. Cincinnati R. Co. v. De Onzo,
100 N. E. 320 tOhio 1012): Reardslee v. Columbia Township, 188 Pa. 496
W4 )): see also 61 UNIxV. F PF.N A. L. Rev. 337. Because of their novelty,
the courts were for a time slow to admit skiagraphs in evidence except upon
minute proof of their scientific accuracy. but there is now no distinction
between an X-ray and a common photograph. .Miller v. Dumon, 24 Wash.
t,48 titoi1; Dean v. W\abash R. Co., 229 Mo. 425 (igio). The skiagraph
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must, of course, be identified as truly representing the object it is claimed to
represent. Lake Shore Ry. v. Hobart, 32 Ohio C. C. 154 (391!). It is ad-
missible when properly authenticated by a qualified physician. Doyle v.
Singer Co., 220 Mass. 327 (1915). Testimony of the physician who took the
picture, or was present at its taking, as to his experience and competency,
and that it is a correct representation, is prima facie sufficient to admit the
skiagraph. Krauss v. Ballinger, 17i ]11. App. 534 (1913); Marion v. Con-
struction Co., 141 N. Y. S. 647 (1913). However, wide discretion is exercised
by the courts as to the sufficiency of the preliminary proof. The skiagraph
must first be proved to be an accurate representation. Ligon v. Allen, 357
Ky. 1oi (1914). When this is once proved, some courts have held that an
omission to show that the medical expert was familiar with X-ray photog-
raphy, Kimball v. Electric Co., 159 Cal. 225 (19x1), or that the condition
of the apparatus was such as to insure a perfect picture, Carlson v. Benton,
66 Neb. 486 (i9o2), was not prejudicial error. But the discretion of the
trial judge is not to be exercised arbitrarily, and to exclude an X-ray photo-
graph when there is uncontradicted evidence of three surgeons of its accuracy
has been held an abuse of discretion. Carlson v. Benton, rupra.
EVIDEXCE-PR'IO'S OrrExsrs-ln an action against one charged with
indecently exposing his person, evidence was offered of similar acts of the
accused toward the complainant a few weeks before the offense charged;
also of similar conduct on his part toward third persons. Hldld: The former
evidence was admissible; the latter was not. Perkins v. Jeffrey, 113 L.T.
456 (Eng. 19is).
The general rule is that where a party is accused of a particular offense,
evidence of the commission of another distinct offense, disconnected with
the crime charged is inadmissible. Rex v. Fisher, 1o2 L T. iii (igio).
Where the criminal act is denied, the admission of such evidence can be
sustained only if the former act is part of the res gcstae. Vincent v. State,
55 S. W. 8ig (Tex. i9oo); or if it is part of a general system or scheme.
Cooke v-. Moore, ii Cush. 213 (-Mass. 1853). Where the criminal act is
admitted, but the criminal intent is denied, evidence of previous acts is
admissible to show such criminal intent, or knowledge, malice or motive, pr
to rebut the defence of accident or mistake. Reg. v. Francis, 30 L T. 503
(1874); State v. Lapage, 57 N. I. 245, 294 (1876). For a statement of the
rule. see 62 U iv. or PENNA. L.w Rhv. 225, and for a discussion of the rule,
see 6i UNIV. oF PENNA. LAwv REV. 319. In some cases such evidence has been
admitted though coming within none of the recognized exceptions. People
v. Fultz, 41 Pac. 1o4o (Cal. 1895); State v. Hummer, 62 AtL 388 (N. J. igo5).
If such evidence is otherwise admissible the mere fact that it tends to show
criminal conduct on the part of the accused, will not exclude it. Maken v.
Atty.-Gen. of Xew South Wales, 69 L. T. 7;8 (1894). Nor is it rendered
inadmissible by the acquittal of the accused of the former offense. McCartney
v. State, 3 Ind. 353 (1852). As to what are similar offenses, is left .largely
to the discretion of the trial court : and the decisions are in hopeless con-
fusion. i Wigmore on Evidence, o2.
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EVIDENCE-PROOF OF XEGLIGENCE-CVSTOMARY USAGE-In an action by an
employee for damages sustained from a defective machine, the employer
offered proof that the machine was the kind customarily used by other firms
in the same business. Held: This could be rebutted by proof that the
machine was obviously inherently dangerous. Sanford Iron WVorks v. Moore,
179 S. W. 373 (Tenn. 1915).
The rule of this case, that proof of conformity to customary usage makes
a prima facie case of non-liability, is the English rule and is supported by the
weight of authority in America. Bleckiner v. Gas Co. 3 L T. 317 (Eng.
i86o) ; Martin v. California Rwy., 94 Cal. 3.26 (189) ; Nyback v. Lumber Co.,
iog Fed. 732 (igoi); Siverson v. Genks, 192 N. Y. S. 382 (19o5). But there
is substantial authority contra, holding that an employer who adopts a ma-
chine in common use is free from negligence. Chrisimer v. Bell Telephone
Co., 1941 Mo. 189 (19o5); Shadford v. Ann Arbor Rwy., iII Mich. 39o (89);
Titus v. Rwy., 136 Pa. 618 (i89o). Under this view it is error to submit the
question of negligence to the jury when the employer has proven that the
machine was the kind customarily used. Central Rwy. v. Ray, 129 Ga. 349
(19o7); Panza v. Lehigh Coal Co, 231 Pa. 577 (igz). But where the evi-
dence as to what is customary is conflicting the question of negligence is then
one for the jury. Shadford v. Rwy., 121 Mich. 224 (x8gg).
The rule is limited in most jurisdictions to instrumentalities and does not
apply to the methods used. Rwy. v. Burton, 9, Ala. 24o (1892). But see
contra, Coal Co. v. Hayes, j28 Pa. .-94 (x889). The doctrine, of course, is
only applicable when the instrument is in good repair. Dean v. Wcodenware
Co., io6 Mo. App. 167 (io4). It is not applicable where the negligence
charged is in breach of a statute. Jones v. Caramel Co., 225 Pa. 644 (19o9).
But evidence that an employer did not use the customary appliances is not
conclusive evidence that he was negligent. Cunningham v. Bridge Works,
197 Pa. 625 (190); Kunz v. Stuart, I Daly 431 (N. Y. 1865). But even
under the rule of the principal case while evidence of the conformity to cus-
tomary usage is not conclusive, it must be admitted. Baird v. Reilly, 35 C. C.
A. 78 (iBW9 ), and it is an error to refuse to allow either the employer or the
employee to give evidence showing what the customary usages of the trade
were. Thayer v. Coal Co, 121 Ia. 121 (19o).
LANDLORD AND TENANT-DEFECTivE CONDITION OF PREMISES-GILL V.
MnDDLLTroN RESTRICTk -- A landlord who was under no obligation to repair,
gratuitously undertook the repair of a handrail on the porch steps.. The
negligent performance thereof caused injury to the tenant's invitee. Held:
The landlord was not liable to any one except the ether party to the contract
and hence owed no duty to the tenant's invitee. Thomas v. Lane, 1o9 N. E.
363 (Mass. 1915).
The rule is that if one makes a gratuitous engagement and actually enters
upon the execution of the business and periorms negligently by which
damages ensues to the other party, an action will lie for such misfeasance.
Balfe v. West. 13 C. B. 466 (Eng. 1853); Tho-'ne v. Deas.'4 Johns. 96 (N. Y.
1&x)). This has been applied to the relationship of landlord and tenant where
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the former has gratuitously undertaken repairs. Gill v. Middleton. zos Mass.
477 (187o); Shute v. Bills. i9j Mass. 433 ioo6W). It has been pointed out
that this is entirely distinct from any question of liability for damages by
reason of a failure to make repairs. Rehder v. Miller, .3 Pa. Super. Ct. 344
( to,-). The landlord may have undertaken the repair work as a favor to
the tenant. Aldag v. Ott, 28 ind. .pp. 5.42 (19o) : or he may. as owner, have
been required to do so by the city. Little Y. McAdaras. 38 Mo. App. 187
(1&4)) ; or he might have torn up the premises solely for a purpose of his
own. O'Dwyer v. O'Brien. 13 X. Y. App. Div. 5;o (1897).
The decision in the principal case raises the question of its effect on the
doctrine of Gill v. Middleton. supra. The court endeavors to make a dis-
tinction by restricting the earlier case to recovery only by the tenant. At any
rate. the principal case seems to disregard the line of cases of its own
jurisdiction, which seem to have gone further than others in extending the
landlord's liability to other users than the actual tenant himself. In Shute
v. Bills. supra. the daughter of the tenant was plaintiff and in Toomey v.
Sanborn. supro. a necessary user of the premises recovered. In Gill v.
Middleton the tenant's wife was held to have an action against the landlord.
A case squarely in accord with the principal case is Malone v. Laskey,
L R. 2 K. B. :41 (Eng. 19o7), where it was held there was no contractual
relation, that the work done amounted only to an innocent representation
and gave the injured wife of a sub-tenant's employee no cause of action.
MNIALICIOUS PROSC'Tuox-TERMIN.FIox OF TILE 'PROSECuVro-N-The de-
fendant caused a warrant to be issued for the plaintiff charging him with false
pretense, but the prosecution was terminated by the order of the justice's
court. Held: This was a sufficient termination to found the action. Hadley
v. Tinnin, 86 S. E. 7o7 (X. C. 1915).
The termination of the previous proceedings in an action for malicious
prosecution must be of such a character as fairly to imply lack of reasonable
grounds for the prosecution. The earlier English cases required a deter-
mination on the merits in the favor of the plaintiff in the second suit. God-
dard v. Smith. 6 Mod. --6 ( 7o4), and there was dicta to the same effect
in earlier American cases. Monroe v. Maples, x Root 553 (Conn. z793).
But this is not the rule of the later deci-ions. Wyatt v. White, 29t L J. Ex.
193 (Eng. i86o). It is sufficient if the accused is discharged by a court hav-
ing jurisdiction. Rider v. Kite, 61 N. J. L 8 (1897) ; Mentel v. Hippely, 165
Pa. 558 (1j85). even though without a hearing on the merits. McDonald v.
National Art Co.. 125 X. Y. Supp. 708 (1910). However. no -action lies if
discharged illegally. Will v. Egan, i6o Pa. 719 (1894). It is sufficient if
the accused is discharged after the indictment has been quashed. Reit v.
.MIeyer, 16o X. Y. App. Div. ;5. (19)4), or after the grand jury has ignored
the indictment. Graves v. Dawson. i3o Mass. 78 (1881). But alitcr when
there has been no discharge by order of the court. \Weisner v. Hansen, 81
X. J. L. (ikn (1g;). So there is a sufficient termination if the prosecutor
abandons the prosecution. fleemer v. Beemer. s) Ont. L R. 69 (0"4). or if
a nolk prosquli is entered even though the court still has jurisdiction to set it
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aside. Banken v. Locke, r36 La. j55 (i9i5); Scheibler v. Sternberg, s29
Tenn. 614 (1914). Hence if there is a discharge after habeas corpus pro-
ceedings and the prosecution is then abandoned, it is sufficient. McKinnan v.
McLaughlin Carriage Co., 37 New Brunswick 3 (i9o4); Holliday v. HoUi-
day, 123 Cal. 26 (1898), contra.
But a termination of the criminal proceeding by the procurement of the
party prosecuted is not a sufficient termination to found an action for mali-
cious prosecution. Ruhl Bros. Brewing Co. v. Atlas Brewing Co., 187 Ill.
App. 392 (1915), nor when the termination was brought about by way of
compromise, for there is no presumption that the action was groundless.
Waters v. Winn, 82 S. E. 537 (Ga. 1914). The same rules apply to actions
for the malicious prosecution of civil actions. Bonney v. King, io3 Ill. App.
6ox (i9o2); Wilson v. Hale, 178 Mass. uit (igoz).
NUIsA E-CoUNT, HOSPITAL EoX TUBERcuLAR P.TENTS-A county
erected a hospital for tubercular patients on its own land with the approval
of the State Board of Health. No danger to the health of the community
existed or could be apprehended. Held: Depreciation in the market value
of adjacent land was not ground for an injunction. City of Northfield v.
Atlantic County, 95 AtI. 745 (N. J. i915).
In order to create a nuisance from the use of property, the use must be
such as to work a tangible injury to the person or property of another, or
render the enjoyment of property essentially uncomfortable. Wood on
Nuisances (2d Ed.)*' § 3. A hospital is not a nuisance per se. Deaconess
Hospital v. Bontyes, 2o7 IlL. 553 (19o4); Board of Health v. Trenton, 63 At.
897 (N. J. 19o6). Nor is a pest-house a nuisance per se, although if it is
carelessly or negligently carried on, it may then-be enjoined. City of Lorain
v. Rolling, 24 Ohio C. C. 8z (1902). The maintenance of a tuberculosis
hospital in a thickly populated section of a city may, however, be enjoined.
Cherry v. Williams, 147 N. C. 452 (i9o8); Everett v. Paschall, 6z Wash.
47 (igi). A hospital may be enjoined from using an operating room in
close proximity to an adjoining owner's windows, and its status as a charit-
able institution is no defense. Kestner v. Hospital, 245 Pa. 326 (i914). But
if a hospital or pest-house is properly located and is conducted without neg-
ligence, it is not a nuisance and an adjacent owner whose land has depreci-
ated in value has no remedy. Barry v. Smith, 191 Mass. 78 (19o6); Frazer
v. City of Chicago, 186 Ill. 481 (0oo). The same is true of a cemetery.
Elliott v. Ferguson, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 40 (19o4) ; Harper v. City of Nashville,
136 Ga. 141 (sg9i).
PRoPRTY-CONVERSION--SPECIFIC PERFORMANE-A lessor agreed to sell
an estate to the lessees upon the happening of a condition. -Held: The lessors
devisee acquired an estate in fee, defeasible on iulfilment of the condition.
Re Marlay, 113 L T. 433 (Eng. qiS).
In deeds and other instruments inter .it,'os. conversion takes place as
from the date of their execution. Wheless v. Wheless, 92.Tenn. 293 (1893).
Where the lessee has an option to purchase, and exercises his option afteir
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the death of the lessor, the realty is converted retrospectively, as between
those claiming under the vendor, the proceeds going to the personal repre-
sentative rather than to the heir or devisee. Lawes v. Bennett, x Cox 167
(Eng. 1785); Collingwood v. Row, 26 L. J. N. S. 649 (Eng. x857). The Eng-
lish rule, Lawes v. Bennett, supra. while consistently followed in England,
has been severely criticized in all subsequent decisions. It has been generally
adopted in America. Waterworks Co. v. Sisson, i8 R. 1. 411 (i86) ; Kerr
v. Day, 14 Pa. 112 (185o), though some courts repudiate it. Smith v. Loewen-
stein, 5o Ohio St. 346 (1893) ; Lime Co. v. Leary, 2o3 N. Y. 469 (xxs)
Many qualifications of the general rule are found. Until the option is
exercised the heir or devisee will be entitled to the rents. Er parte Hardy,
3o Beav. 2o6 (Eng. 1861); In re Isaacs, L R. (1894), 3 Ch. 5o6. (Eng.).
The conversion will not relate back so as to dissolve an attachment levied on
the land as that of the grantor. Sheehy v. Scott, 128 Iowa 55! (gos).
Where part of the property is destroyed prior to the declaration of the
option, the conversion does not relate back so as to entitle the vendee to the
insurance money. Gilbert v. Port, 28 Ohio St. 276 (1876) ; Caldwell v. Frazier,
68 Pac. io76 (Kan. i9o2). See also People's Rwy. Co. v. Spencer, is6 Pa. 8s
(1893). Moreover, the doctrine of Lawes v. Bennett is distinguished wher-
ever possible so as to favor the heir or devisee, as where the will contains an
express stipulation. Drant v. Vause, ii L. J. Ch. N. S. i7o (Eng. z842). It
does not apply as between the vendor and the vendee themselves. Edwards v..
West, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 858 (Eng 1876).
PROPRY-OBsTRUCTION OF PUBLIC ROAD--RIGHTS OF OWNqER OF FIX-
A huckster sold fruit from his wagon which stood on a public road. The
owner of the fee of the road ordered him to move on, and when be refused,
put him off forcibly. In an action for assault and battery the defendant
pleaded the ownership of the fee. Held: While owning the fee the posses-
sion was not exclusive, the plaintiff's use was not an additional burden, and
the owner of the fee was not justified in using force. Hart v. Jones, 7o
So. 2o6 (Ala. x195).
It is generally the law, that where the abutting owner does own the fee
of the street he has all the usual rights of ownership, subject to a public
easement. Huffman v. State, 21 Ind. App. 449 (i898); Angell, *Highways,
§ 319; 2 Elliott, Roads and Streets, § 896; 3 Kent's Com., p. 432. The
public's only right is one of passage. Huffman v. State, supra; Adams v.
Rivers, ii Barb. 390 (N. Y. 1851). Anyone committing violence on a public
road or using it as a market or habitual standing place, is generally consid-
ered a trespasser as to the owner of the fee, having exceeded the right of
passage, and may be dealt with as such, contrary to the principal case. Mc-
Donald v. City of Newark, 42 N. J. Eq. x36 (z886); Adams v. Rivers, supra;
State v. Buckner, Phillips 558 (N. C. i868). And the owner of the fee
would be entitled to use reasonable force in expelling such a- trespasser.
Hannabalson v. Sessions, xx6 Ia. 457 (1902); Gyre v. Culver, 47 Barb. $92
(N. Y. 1867); Souter v. Codman, 14 R. I. i19 (x883).
PROPERY-R'LE AGAINST PERPETUITIEs-A testator devised his estate
in trust for his children for their lives, remainder in fee to his grandchildren.
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possession being postponed until majority of the youngest grandchild. Held:
The trust did not violate'the rule against perpetuities. Dorrance v. Dorrance,
227 Fed. 679 (1915).
No future interest in property may be created which will not vest within
twenty-one years after lives in being. Eaton v. Eaton, 88 Conn. 269 (x914);
Gambrill v. Gambrill, z22 Md. 563 (1914); Merkel v. Capone, 81 N. J. Eq.
282 (1913). This rule deals only with the actual vesting of the title, so that
it is not violated if the actual possession is deferred. Grady v. Whittemore,
192 Mass. 367 (x9o6); Kountz's Estate, 213 Pa. 39 (0o6); Salisbury v.
Salisbury, 92 Kan. 644 0914). But it is essential that the legal estate not
only may, but must necessarily, vest within the prescribed period. Bates v.
Spooner, 75 Conn. 5ox (r9o3); Asylum v. Lefebre, 69 N. H. 238 (z898);
Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348 (x9t4).
A trust created for charitable or public purposes is not subject to similar
limitations. Ingraham v. Ingraham, i69 IlL 432 (1897). But charitable
donations, if contingent and executory, form no exception to the rule against
perpetuities. Booth v. Church, 126 N. Y. 215 (1891); Russell v. Girard
Trust Co., x7I Fed. 161 (i9o). If, however, the gift for charitable purposes
is immediate, it is valid, though the application of the fund'may be uncer-
tain. Philadelphia v. Girard, 45 Pa. 9 (863).
SALES-CoNn 1L G WARR.-.T-BEAcn-Bond brokers warranted a
bond to be a first mortgage bond, well secured and a safe -investment. After
!hree years a default in interest occurred and the mortgaged -property was
sold under foreclosure proceedings. Held: The warranty related to the time
of sale, and was not a warranty that the investment would continue safe
until the maturity of the bond. Menard v. Thompson & Sons, 96 AtL x77
(Conn. 19t5).
Ordinarily a warranty refers to the state of affairs at the time of sale,
Iroquois Furnace Co. v. Wilkin Mfg. Co., 77 IlL App. 59 (1898); Schuwirth
v. Thumma, 66 S. IV. 6§x (Tex. Civ. App. i9o2), and will be so construed
in the absence of a clear understanding to thq contrary. American Syrup
& Preserving Co. v. Roberts, 11z Ind. i8 (igIo). But a warranty may extend
to future defects and events by express agreement, Fountain v. Hagan Gas
Engine & Mfg. Co., 78 S. E. 423 (Ga. -1913) ; Franklin Mfg. Co. v. Lamson
Mfg. Co., i89 Mass. 344, 75 N. E. 6z4 (19o5); Scott v. Keeth, x6 N. W.
183 (Mich. igo8), or where representations as to future defects and events
necessarily carry with them a representation as to a present condition. Ault-
- man v. Weber, 28 IIl App. 9! (888) ; Landreth v. Wyckoff, 73 N. Y. S. 388
(190); Huntingdon v. Lombard, 22 Wash. 2o2, 6o Pac. 414 (19oo). Where
machinery is warranted to produce a certain quantity at a specified rate, there
being no time limit set, the warranty has been construed to extend over a
reasonable period. Danville Coal & Ice Co. v. Vilter Mfg. Co., 25 Ky. Law
1974. 79 $. W. 225 (19o4); Sprout, Waldron & Co. v. Hunter, 30 Ky. Law
380 (1907). A warranty of soundness of aimals relates to their condition
at the time of sale, and covers any unsoundness then existing though it may
not become manifest until such subsequent time as is necessary in the prog-
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ress of the disease, to produce its effects. Stevens v. Glover, 14 Ga. App.
540 (1914); Kenner v. Harding, 85 Ill. -264 (1877); McCann v. Ullman,
109 Wis. 574 (1901).
SAL.S-RESCISSION-CONCEALMENT OF INSOLvE cY-A purchaser of goods,
who had no reasonable expectation of being able to pay, failed to disclose
his financial condition to the seller. Held: The seller could rescind the sale.
Parker-Blake Co. v. Ladd, 70 So. 188 (Ala. i915).
The law is well settled that mere non-disclosure of insolvency is not
of itself sufficient to render a sale voidable. Lumber Co. v. Hubbell, 143
N. Y. App. 317 (19ii); Stein v. Hill, ioo Mo. App. 38 (i9o3); Tailor Co. v.
Appenzellar, 42 Pa. Super. Ct. 414 (1910). It is also generally accepted that
where the purchaser intends not to pay for the goods, the seller may rescind
the sale. li re Marks & Co., 34 C. C. A. 253 (1914); Trading Co. v. Skinner,
7o5 X. E. 784 (Ind. 1914). Pennsylvania alone requires a false representation
in addition to an intention not to pay. Smith v. Smith, 21 Pa. 367 (1853);
Bughman Y. Bank, i59 Pa. 94 (1893). A failure to disclose insolvency where
there is no reasonable expectation to pay had been held tantamount to an intent
not to pay and to afford ground for rescission. Skinner v. Hoop Co., 119
Mich. 467 (iQ) ; Maxwell v. Brown Shoe Co., 114 Ala. 3a4 (1897). See also
Richardson v. Vkk, 145 S. W. 174 (Tenn. i9io).
SURETYSHIP-HUSBAND AND WiFE-A wife borrowed money from her
husband's debtor and returned it in payment of her husband's debt. Held:
Although she became nominally the principal debtor on a new obligation, yet
she was a surety for her husband's debt and as such was not liable. Staples,
v. City Bank and Trust Co., 70 So. 115 (Ala. 1915).
By statute a married woman may not become surety for her husband
in most jurisdictions. Harbaugh v. Tanner, 71 N. E. 145 (Ind. 1904);
Russell v. Rice, 44 S. W. i1o (Ky. 1898); Hazleton Nat. Bank v. Kintz, 24
Pa. Super. 456 (19o4). So also in a few states by decision. Feather v.
Feather's Estate, 74 N. W. 524 (Mich. 1898). But she may become surety
for her husband in those jurisdictions which have by statute removed the
common law disability of a wife to contract. Grandy v. Campbell, 78 Mo.
App. 502 (1899); Cooper v. Bank of Indian Territory, 46 Pac. 475 (Olda.
1896). Also in a few jurisdictions a contract of suretyship is binding on a
married woman when made on the credit of her separate estate. McKell v.
Merchants' Nat. Bank, 87 N. W. 317 (Neb. 1goi). The question whether a
married woman is principal or surety in an obligation to which her husband
is a party is to be solved by inquiring whether she received the benefit of
the consideration on which the contract rested. Leschen v. Grey, 48 N. k
344 (Ind. 1897); Hines & Co. v. Hays, 82 S. W. i007 (Ky. i94); Sibley v.
Robertson, 212 Pa. 24 (1905). Some states by statute allow a married
woman to become a surety for a third person. Warder, Bushnell & Gless-
ner Co. v. Stewart. 36 At. 8, (Del. 1896) ; Hart v. Grigsby, 77 Ky. U2 (i879).
Others allow it if the husband consents. Hollingsworth v. Spanier, 32 La.
Ann. 203 (88o); Union Nat. Bank v. Chapman, 39 N. Y. Supp. zons (1896).
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TORTS-ANIMALs-RIGHT TO KILL A Doc-The father of a child bitten
by a dog, suspecting that it was mad, upon the refusal of the owner to sell
it, broke into the owner's house, killed the dog, which was tied therein, and
took its head to send to the Pasteur Institute for examination. Held: The
father was liable. Allen v. Camp, 7o So. 29o (Ala. z9xS).
In addition to the rather obvious right of one attached by a dog to
kill it in-self-defense. Credit v. Brown, io Johns 365 (N. Y. 1813), it has been
held that a ferocious dog, accustomed to bite mankind, is a common nuisance
and if found at large may be destroyed by anyone. Woolf v. Chalker, 31
Conn. 121 (1862). In Pennsylvania it was held at an early date that one
bitten by a mad dog might kill it even at a later time, as a nuisance. Bowers
v. Fitzrandolph, Add. 214 (Pa. 1794). A dog merely trespassing, however,
may not be killed unless actually doing injury to person or property. Reed v.
Goldneck, 112 Mo. App. 310 (ipo5); and this is true though the owner has
been notified to keep it off one's premises. Hodges v. Causey, 77 Miss.
353 (1899). It is held quite generally, either by statute or by decision, that
a sheep-killing dog may be killed without liability. Throne v. Mead, z22
Mich. 273 (1899). The principal case appears to be the first in which this
humanitarian justification has been offered for such a killing and under its
facts appears to establish a distinct precedent. These circumstances were
admitted by the court in mitigation of damages only.
TRIALS-IMROPER REMARKS OF CouxsEL-In an action by a domestic ser-
vant to the case. Thus appeals to race or local prejudice are improper,
counsel that the jury should give her what they would want their mother or
sister to have under like circumstances, was improper. Gungrich v. Anderson,
155 N. W. 379 (Mich. 1915).
It is the right of counsel to indulge in all fair argument in favor of
his client, but he is outside of his right when he appeals to prejudice irrele-
vant to the case. Thus appeals to race or local prejudice are improper.
Garritty v. Rankin, 55 S. NV. 367 (Tex. igoo); appeals to prejudice against
corporations are improper, Whipple v. .Michigan R. Co., 143 Mich. 41 (io6) ;
likewise, reference to wealth or poverty of the parties, Birmingham Co. v.
Gonzalez, 183 Ala. 273 (1913); White v. Chicago Ry., 145 Iowa 4o8 (i9io);
U. S. Cement Co. v. Cooper, 172 Ind. 599 (igog); or reference to the forlorn
or helpless condition of the parties. Appel v. Chicago Ry. Co., 25o IlL 561
(1913) ; Texas Ry. Co. v. Pledger, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 248 (i9o4). It is the
duty of the court to keep impassioned oratory within the limits of the
record. Ilaake v. Milling Co., 168 Mo. App. 177 (1913). Where the argu-
ment of counsel is calculated to arouse the passions and prejudice of a jury
by presenting to them considerations extraneous to the evidence, this is
ground for reversal. Chicago, etc., I. Co. v. Rowell, i5I Ky. 313 (1912);
Englund v. Traction Co., 139 I1. App. 57-2 (19o8). So a statement that every
father, mother and business man was watching the suit was improper.
Citizens' Bank v. Insurance Co., 86 Vt. 2-67 (1912). In an action for
injuries received from an automobile, the argument of counsel asking a
verdict in order to protect the lives of citizens on the highway.and to warn
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drivers, was not within the range of legitimate argument Veil K. 
Hagan,
161 Ky. .,)2 (1915). And an argument that there is no recompense 
that
can in any way compensate a parent for the loss of a child. -is improper.
Duke v. St. Louis. etc.. Ry., 172 Fed. 604 (igog) ; Chicago City Ry. v. 
Math,
114 Ill. App. 35o (moo4). Even though arguments may 
be likely to excite the
prejudice of a jury. they are not. improper if predicated on the 
evidence.
Burton v. Kansas City. 181 Mo. App. 427 (1914); Mahoney v. Goldblatt, 
163
111. App. 563 (1912). An interrogation whether the jury -would fall 
into a
sewer for that sum and go through life that way. or have their 
son go
through life that way," was improper, Morrison v. Carpenter. i,-9 Mich. 
2o7
(1914) ; or an argument that the jury should allow such 
damages as they
would take or as would compensate them, had they been injured. 
South-
western Tele. Co. v. Anderson, 169 S. W. 218 (Tex. 1914); Wells 
v. Ann
Arbor R. Co., i5o X. V. 34o (.Mich 1915); but see Adams Exp. Co. 
v.
Aldridge, 2o Colo. App. 74 (19o4), contra.
In Pennsylvania the practice in such cases where counsel makes 
an
improper argument is to withdraw a juror and continue the case. Saxton 
v.
Pittsburg Ry., 219 Pa. 492 (igoS). But this question is within the sound
discretion of the trial judge. Shaffer v. Coleman. 35 Pa. Super. 386 (19o8).
TRUSTS-EXEC'TON BY TRUsT-EcT oF RntmasE'B BE.rc-camy-
A trust for the grantor's son called for an absolute conveyance in fee upon
the son attaining majority. At the father's suggestion the trustee conveyed
only a life estate and obtained a formal confirmation of the transaction
from the ccstui quc trust. Held: The release could not be binding on the
beneficiary because of improper consideration and the effect of the convey-
ance was to pass to the beneficiary the entire estate contemplated by the
terms of the trust deed. McPike v. MePike, IST S. W. 2 (Mo. 1915).
While it is clear that the cestui que trust may give a release or formal
confirmation to the trustee, Pope v. Farnsworth, 146 Mass. 339" (z888), it
is equally a well settled rule that the courts will closely scrutinize such agree-
ments. Richardson's Adm'rs v. Spencer, 57 KY. 45o (1857), and the burden
of proof that the transaction was a righteous one is placed upon the trustee.
Allen v. Bryant, 42 N. C. 276 (8.;): Appeal of NWistar. 54 Pa. 6 (1866).
It has been held that the beneficiary must contract with full kmowledge of
the circumstances. Boyd v. Hawkins, 17 N. C. 195 (iS); Jones v. Uoyd,
x- 11. 597 ( 806). and also that the cestui que trust must know the .law and
what his legal rights are. Saunders v. Richard. 35- M. 2 (s8pS). In the
principal case the court intimated the father's presence and his wishes were
undue influence. It has been held that this element as well as fear of the
trustee must not be present. Barnard v. Stone, 159 Mass. 224 (i83). If
the beneficiary has just come of age, as in the principal case. he ought to
have proper legal advice. Kirby v. Taylor, 6 Johns Ch. 242 (X. Y. 1822);
Stanley's App. 8 Pa. 431 (1848).
OF CI.A-%is-A testator acquired a tract
of land. part nf the purchase price having ben borrowed from his wife,
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which land he devised to his wife in fee together with life estatcs in other
tracts. Held: The devise was a satisfaction of the wife's debt. Whitaker
v. Whitaker, 179 S. W. 584 (Ky. z915).
It is a familiar doctrine in equity that if one, who is indebted to another,
by his will gives that other a sum of money equal to or greater than the
debt, a presumption arises that such gift was intended as a satisfaction of
the debt. Atkinson v. Littlewood, L R. j8 Eq. ;95 (Eng. z8'2); Allen v.
Merwin. 121 Mass. 378 (i876). However, in many cases such a rule fails
to give effect to the true intention of the testator and for this reason it is
not favored by courts of equity. Edelen v. Dent, 2 Gill and J. 185 (Md.
183o). Because of the strong leaning of the courts away from this doctrine
a large number of exceptions have grown up which prevent its application
in many instances. For example, the presumption of satisfaction does not
arise where the legacy is of a different nature than the debt, hence a gift
by will of lands or specific chattels is not a satisfaction of a pecuniary
obligation. Smith v. Marshall, z Root 159 (Conn. 1790); Partridge v. Part-
ridge, 2 Har. and J. 63 (Md. 1807). This exception seems to have been dis-
regarded in the principal case on the ground that it would not give effect
to the testator's intention. Nor does the presumption arise where the debt
is uncertain or contingent, or where the pament of the legacy is made to
depend upon a contingency. Homer v. McGaughy. 62 Pa. 189 (iS69): Gil-
man v. Brown, 43 Miss. 641 (i87o). Likewise, where the testator by his will
directs that debts and legacies shall be paid, it is well settled that this shows
an intention that both should be paid and overcomes the presumption of
satisfaction. Iassel v. Hawkins, 4 Drew. 468 (Eng. i89); Strong v. Wil-
liams, 12 Mass. 389 (i815) ; and it has been decided that the same result
will be reached if debts alone are directed to be paid. Glover v. Hardcup,
34 Beav. 74 (Eng. z864); Cloud v. Clinkenbeard, 8 B. Mon. 397 (Ky. 1848).
If the amount of the legacy is less than the debt there is no presumption of
satisfaction pro tanto. Atkinson v. Webb, 2 Vern. A,78 (Eng. 1704); Eaton
v. Benton, 2 Hill 576 (1842) ; see also Cloud v. Clinkinbeard, supra. Finally,
a further exception to the general rule will be found in those cases where
the legacy is payable at a time different than the date at which the debt
becomes payable. Van Riper v. Van Riper, 2 N. J. Eq. 1 (1838); Byrne v.
Byrne, 3 S. & R. 54 (Pa. 1817).
WVhere a father or person standing in loco parcftis to the legatee owes
a debt to the legatee, the case is governed in every respect by the same
rules as though the father and child were strangers to each other. Tolson
v. Collins, 4 Ves. 483 (Eng. 1799); although the question of such relation
is highly important in cases of satisfaction of legacies by advancements. EX
parte Pye, 18 Ves. i5s (Eng. 18t1). With regard to legacies from a cred-
itor to a debtor there is no presumption either in favor of or against satis-
faction of the debt owing the testator. and this is true whether the legacy
is equal to or is greater or smaller than the debt. Sharp v. Whitman. --o5
Pa. -.85 (Oto3); Irvine v. Palmer, 91 Tenn. 463 (18)2).
Wn.Ls-TEsT.ENTR CACrrY-PRrs.riox-The testatrix disin-
herited her only son and the will waz controverted on the grounds of lack
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of testamentary capacity. Held: An unnatural disposition is a factor which
the jury may consider in connection with other evidence in probing the
testatrix's sanity, but.this alone will not justify a presumption of incapacity.
Breadheft v. Cleveland, izo N. E. 662 (Ind. 1gs).
The 'nell-settled rule is that an unnatural disposition of a testators
estate is evidence which may be considered in judging his testamentary
capacity. I)onan v. Donan, 236 Ill. 341 (ito8); Barker v. Comnis, Ito Mass.
477 (7.!). But it is equally well settled that disinheritance of a natural
heir without further evidence is not enough to establish lack of testamentary
capacity. Graham v. Deuterman, o6 Ill. 378 (193o). It has been held that
to hold otherwise would deprive the testator of the right to dispose as he
sees fit. Zimlich v. Zimlich, go Ky. 657 (48go). The testator may have a
prejudice, and whether just or unjust, it is not for review by the jury.,
Donan v. Donan, supra; Re Cary, 56 Colo. -f (1913); and it has been held
that once a prejudice is revealed it robs the unnatural distribution of all
weight as evidence of mental incapacity. In re Morgan, 219 Pa. 355 (19g8).
The more difficult task for a jury is to determine first whether the dis-
inlic:itance call be classed as unnatural. It has been held that the disinher-
itance of the testator's children is prima facie an unnatural and unreasonable
act. Hardenburgh v. Hardenburgh, 133 Ia. z (igo6). But the better view
is to determine it from all the circumstances-the relations which existed
between the testator on the one hand and the persons disinherited and the
legatees on the other. Cheney v. Gold, 25 IlL .394 (i9o7). It has been held
the extent of the estate, the pecuniary condition of- the beneficiaries, as well
as those who present alleged natural claims, should be considered. Stubbs
v. Houston, 33 ALa. 555 (1858).
WILLS-WITNEsS-SI.ING IN TasT.ros's PasEN cE-Witnesses to the
will of a blind man signed it in the same room and about four feet away
from him. The question was whether this was a signing "in the presence"
of the testator, as required by statute. Held: Since the testator was fully
conscious of what was going on by means of his other senses, this consti-
tuted a sufficient signing "in his presence." In re Allred's Will, 86 S. E.
1o47 (N. C. 1915).
The statute of i Vict. c. 6. s. 9, and most of the American statutes,
requires the witnesses of a will to sign "in the presence" of the testator. It
is not necessary that the testator actually see the signing, if it is in his
presence; otherwise no blind person could make a valid will under such a
statute. Turner Y. Cook, 36 Ind. i-" (1871); Riggs v. Riggs, 135 Mass. 238
01883) ; Ray v. Hill, 3 Strob. 297 (S. C. 1,48). In the same room is "in
h:s presence." In re Howard's Will, 17 Am. Dec. 6o (Ky. 1827). In an
adJoining room. but out of sight, is generally held not to satisfy the statute.
roldry v. Parris. i6 Mass. 433 (t848); Mandeville v. Parker, 31 N. J. Eq.
242 (WpT,)). Ilut if the testator could see the witnesses, the statute is ful-
filled. Drury v. Connell. 177 Ill. 43 (t8>) ; Tlopkins v. wheelcr, 2t R. I.
533 (;oool. It has also been held that the testator must he. in a position to
see the pap~er as well as the witnesses. P, untey v. Allen. 212 N. C. 314 Of9t).
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Some states do not have this requirement in the statutes. Herrick v. Snyder,
5o N. Y. S. 2-9 (i8g), i Consol. Laws of N. Y., p. 511, § 21-4; Irvine's
Estate, 2o6 Pa. i (19o3), Act of Apr. 8, 1833, P. L 4 § 6. See also
i Underhill: Wills, § 196; Williams: Executors, p. 62 ff.; x Jarman: Wills,
p. 118 ff.
